Publications
Peer-Reviewed Articles
- “Minds and real kinds”, Synthese 206 (3): 1–19 (2025). I reject Mind-Independence as a criterion for realism about kinds. Instead, I introduce the criterion of Representational Independence of Causal Powers (RICP) as the grounds of the distinction between real kinds and bogus kinds. I argue that a kind is real if its causal powers are independent of representations of it, helping explain why some mind‑dependent kinds are real (like psychological and social kinds) while others are not (like phlogiston and fairies).
Public Philosophy
I value public philosophy and its goal of making philosophy accessible to everyone. I have contributed to public philosophy through writing, transcription, and community educational programming.
- "Did Kant Make Skepticism Worse?”, Philosophy Now!, May/June 2020
- "Foucault’s Elephant”, Philosophy Now!, Aug/Sept 2018
- Collaborating Transcriber – Margaret Cavendish’s Philosophical and Physical Opinions, KU Digital Project (2019)